Abstract Leveraged buyouts (LBO) means the acquisition of a company using bonds and loans. There are the prolific volumes of LBO transactions in the international M&A markets, and its influence to the financial market is increasingly huge. However, there are very few LBO transaction in the domestic M&A market and there are also few researches in this field due to the private nature of LBO transactions. Once a company is privatized through a LBO transaction, it is not so long before it is relisted on the stock exchange or it is resold to a third-party investor. In order to repay the borrowed money, an LBO investor may decide to end a company's private status through an exit via an initial public offering (IPO) or a takeover. In this paper, we expand Kaplan's study on the organizational status of post leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction. We find that there is a significant change starting 1986. Most notably, fewer LBOs remain private, the median holding period of the LBO was cut in half to 3.2 years and of those that exit, IPO exits had significantly shorter holding periods. Regression analysis shows that good market conditions lengthen the holding period of a LBO investment whereas the size of the transaction shortens it. 
Introduction and Prior Literature
Kaplan [1] conducted a study on the organizational status of 183 LBOs between 1979 and 1986 where he showed that 62% of them were still privately owned, 14% are now independent companies and 24% are owned by other public companies. Kaplan's study on the organizational status of 183 LBOs between 1979 and 1986 showed that the median holding period for these transactions was 6.82 years, and reasons from this that LBOs were neither short-lived nor permanent but are transitory organizational forms. Kaplan agrees with Rappaport's [2] view that they are transitory organizational forms.
Brau, Francis, and Kohers [3] tested whether the private company would exit via an IPO or acquisition, using a sample of 9,500 private US companies. Brau, Francis, and Kohers [3] has showed that companies belonging to a hitech industry and to an industry with high concentration, current cost of debt, percent of inside ownership in the firm, size of the firm, and the "hotness" of the IPO market improve the chances of a private company to go public. Chemmanur and Fulghieri [4] addressed when a firm go public rather than undertake its projects using private equity financing. They posited that the equilibrium timing of the going-public decision is determined by the firm's trade-off between placing shares privately with a risk-averse venture capitalist and selling shares in an IPO to numerous small investors.
Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor [5] also analyzed an entrepreneur's choice between private and public ownership in the theoretical framework.
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales [6] have studied a large sample of Italian companies to find out why some companies decide to go public while others do not. They found that the most obvious benefit of going public is to gain access to an alternative to bank finance and reduce the cost of capital. So companies with large investment plans and high levels of debt or leverage are likely to go public. Going public may also give the company more bargaining power relative to its bankers and reduce its interest costs on existing debt. Pagano and Roell [7] compared to different strategies of going public and selling shares privately. They argue that going public is more costly but can lead to more dispersion of share holders and therefore the controlling shareholder can avoid excessive monitoring from other shareholders.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Information regarding LBO transactions is extremely private. Private equity firms are hesitant in emitting not only the terms of the deal, but also the exact dollar amount of the deal to the general public due to the exclusiveness of their business. Public relations departments of some private equity shops would not even provide us with the names of the companies they purchased through LBOs. we had no choice but to collect the data I needed manually.
We decided to use the reverse process, in other words, start from certain information. In one way or another, private equity firms have to raise debt from the capital market to finance their LBOs and they must provide debt investors with some information. There were more detailed information regarding the debt data of the LBO transaction such as trances, rates and covenants but we did not need this information. Adding an additional 11 private equity firms that we were familiar with, our search under the 21 private equity firms provided us with debt data on more than 500 LBO transactions. There were certain cases where the private equity firms raised debt on two different dates for the same transaction, in which we added the two observations and used the earlier date for regression purposes. Because of the exclusiveness of these transactions, there was certain information that even VentureXpert did not have -most of them being the exact size of the transaction and the date and value of the exit. From the 500 or more debt data points, there were only 200 data points that contained some or all the Table 1 . There were 21 known private equity firms represented in our sample but we could not identify the sponsoring private equity firm for 10 observations.
Out of the ones that we could identify, 61.5% were the "powerful" private equity firms according to Fortune 500.
We categorized the industry of the LBO companies We also measured market condition at that time using the Standard & Poor 500 Index. We categorized the market condition as "Bull" whenever the index returned more than its 20 year historical average of 9.3% and "Bear" else wise. To obtain a measure for the cost of debt at that time period, we used the 30-year U.S. TreasuryBill rate obtained from Yahoo! Finance.
Testing Model and Results
In our paper, it would be naturally interesting to find what affects a LBO created private company's decision of exiting through an IPO or acquisition. Our initial conjecture was that for LBO transactions, the reputation of the private equity firm and the leverage of the transaction would also affect the IPO/Acquisition decision for LBO created private companies. Considering that all private equity firms' first goal is to sell the company to the other buyer than conducting an IPO, more "powerful" private equity firms might be able to find and negotiate with potential buyers more easily than the other "not-so -powerful" firms, thus lower probability of an IPO. For leverage, if the leverage of the LBO transaction were to be relatively high and the target company has a handful of debt in its balance sheet, IPO would be a good way to diversify its capital structure with equity and hence increase in the private company's probability of an IPO.
LBOs take advantage of the tax shield of debt and the "shock therapy" of the private equity firm, and exit when there is return to be made. From the data we collected, hand would lengthen the holding period as larger firms will have a harder time arranging the exit transaction (whether it be an IPO or acquisition) and the public or potential acquirer would be hesitant in investing a company that is heavily levered. Table 2 shows that the resulting regression was significant with where the market conditions lengthened the holding period and the size of the transaction shortening the holding period. These results were opposite of our initial predictions. Since we convince that our model has been correctly specified one with well-measured variables, a low R 2 in Table 2 would be of only secondary interest to us as in most finance papers.
Conclusions
In our paper, we obtained also more interesting results about the holding periods of LBO transactions. We conducted an in-depth analysis on our data more than the study of Kaplan Private equity firms play a valuable role in helping transform under-performing companies. While controlling financial stability issues, policies to boost M&A and private equity markets should be strongly implemented.
